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T he Plain Language Court
David A. Strausst

We often identify an era in the Supreme Court’s history by
associating it with the Chief Justice: the Marshall Court, the Warren
Court, the Rehnquist Court, the Roberts Court. But of course that
practice can be misleading. The Chief Justice has just one vote, and new
Justices can change the character of the Court even if the Chief Justice is
the same. The Marshall Court became more fragmented after 1827,
when Chief Justice Marshall’s original colleagues were succeeded by new
appointees. The Warren Court is said to have become more “liberal and
activist” when Justice Arthur Goldberg replaced Justice Felix
Frankfurter. And the Rehnquist Court arguably “took a distinctive turn
in the mid-1990s.”*1The new appointee who will replace Justice Antonin
Scalia may, similarly, change the character of the Roberts Court in
significant ways.
In one respect, though, a distinctive feature of the Roberts Court
seems destined to persist for some time, no matter who replaces Justice
Scalia. The Roberts Court has embraced a plain language approach to
statutory interpretation. That approach often prevailed in previous
Courts, but it was controversial, and the Court, previously, was closely
divided on the question whether it was the right approach. On the
Roberts Court, though, the plain language approach seems to be
accepted nearly unanimously.
The plain language approach is more easily illustrated than
described, but roughly it is a matter of trying to resolve issues about
t Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This
Paper was prompted by an invitation to participate in a panel on the Roberts Court and
Statutory Interpretation at the Symposium on the Tenth Anniversary of the Roberts Court, at
the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I am grateful to my fellow participants in the
conference for their discussion of the Court, and to the Burton and Adrienne Glazov Faculty
Fund at the University of Chicago Law School for its financial support.
i Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis,
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 570 (2003); see id. at 569 & n.l (quoting DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
Constitution in the Supreme C ourt : T he First H undred Years, 1789-1888, at 127-28
(1985) (discussing the Marshall Court)); id. at n.2 (quoting DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
C onstitution in the Supreme C ourt : T he Second Century , 1888-1986, at 415 (1990)
(discussing the Warren Court)).
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statutory interpretation by looking exclusively, or nearly exclusively, to
the language of the statute.2 Other materials—legislative history,
possible purposes of the statute, settled administrative or judicial
practice under the statute, or policy judgm ents—come into the picture,
if at all, only to resolve otherwise intractable vagueness in the statutory
language or, more often, to reinforce conclusions that are derived from
the language alone. The plain language approach is vulnerable to the
objection that the drafters of a statute will not have the foresight, or the
linguistic resources, to provide for every contingency. The language
alone might, for that reason, not be a good guide to the legislature’s
judgm ent about the issue before the court. Especially in cases that are
controversial enough to give rise to litigation, one might argue that
judges should be prepared to look beyond the words of the statute and
try to carry out the purposes of the statute even if the ultimate
conclusion is not the one that emerges most clearly from the words
alone. But that kind of “purposivist” approach, which has been losing
ground for some time,34now seems to be in near-total eclipse on the
Supreme C ourt—so nearly total that it is unlikely to emerge again no
matter what the views of the next appointee.
I.

The Roberts C ourt’s decision in Milner v. Department of the NavyP
decided in 2011, makes the point nicely.5 In Milner, the plain language
of the statute pretty clearly dictated the result that the Court reached,
but that result was questionable on many other grounds. The Court
could easily have justified a departure from the plain language in Milner.
Instead, the C ourt—which was fully aware of the counter-arguments—
followed the plain language. And, most important, the decision was
nearly unanimous. Only Justice Breyer dissented. All of that makes
Milner a powerful indication of the hold that the plain language
approach has on the Roberts Court.
2 For leading accounts, defining this approach in various ways, see, for example, John F.
Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 Calif. L. Rev . 1287 (2010); Jonathan T. Molot, The
Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev . 1 (2006).
3 For an argument that the plain language approach has prevailed in both the Rehnquist
and the Roberts Courts, see John F. Manning, Foreword, The Means of Constitutional Power,
128 HARV. L. Rev . 1, 22-29 (2014). That approach was much more controversial within the
Rehnquist Court than it appears to be today. Compare, for example, Milner v. Department of
the Navy, 562 U.S. 562 (2011) (8-1 decision resting on plain language arguments) with Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (5-4 decision).
4 562 U.S. 562.
5 John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. Ct . Rev. 113,116-17, similarly treats
Milner as an important illustration of the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation.
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Milner concerned the interpretation of the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA).6 FOIA imposes a general requirement on federal agencies
to disclose government records on request, but there are several specific
exemptions for certain categories of records that need not be disclosed.
The records at issue in Milner concerned weapons, ammunition, and
explosives that the Navy stores at a base in Washington State.
Specifically, the records were “Explosive Safety Quantity Distance
(ESQD) inform ation---- [which] prescribes ‘minimum separation
distances’ for explosives and helps the Navy design and construct
storage facilities to prevent chain reactions in case of detonation.”7 The
ESQD information would, quite obviously, be helpful to, for example, a
foreign enemy or someone planning a terrorist attack on the naval base.
When an individual filed a FOIA request for that information, the
Department of the Navy refused to disclose it.
The Navy invoked an exemption—Exemption 2—that applies to
records “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of
[the] agency.”8 The Navy relied on an interpretation of that exemption
that the District of Columbia Circuit provided in a case it decided in
1981, Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms.9 Crooker ruled
that Exemption 2 applied not just to such matters as “pay, pensions,
vacations, hours of work, lunch hours, parking[,] etc.,”10 but more
broadly to any “predominantly internal”*11 records if the disclosure of
those records would “significantly risk[] circumvention of agency
regulations or statutes.”12 At least three other courts of appeals followed
the Crooker court’s interpretation of Exemption 2.13 The Supreme Court
noted in Milner that Crooker “spawned a new terminology: Courts
applying the Crooker approach . . . refer to the ‘Low 2’ exemption when
discussing materials concerning human resources and employee
relations, and to the ‘High 2’ exemption when assessing records whose
disclosure would risk circumvention of the law.”14
The Supreme Court ruled that the Navy had to disclose the ESQD
material because Crooker s “High 2” interpretation of Exemption 2 was
6 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
7 Milner, 562 U.S. at 568 (citation omitted).
8 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2).
9 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc), abrogated by Milner, 562 U.S. 562.
10 Id. at 1056 (quoting Jordan v. Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
11 Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1056-57.
12 Id. at 1074.
13 Milner v. U.S. Dep’t o f the Navy, 575 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d and remanded
by Milner, 562 U.S. 562; Massey v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 622 (2d Cir. 1993), abrogated by Milner, 562
U.S. 562; Kaganove v. EPA, 856 F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1988), abrogated by Milner, 562 U.S.
562.
14 Milner, 562 U.S. at 567 (citing Milner, 575 F.3d at 963, and Schiller v. NLRB, 964 F.2d
1205,1208 (D.C. Cir. 1992), abrogated by Milner, 562 U.S. 562).
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inconsistent with the language of the statute. The “key word” in the text
of Exemption 2, the Court said, is “personnel,”15 and “personnel,” in
“common parlance,” refers to “hum an resources matters.”16 The Court
noted that the word “personnel” was used elsewhere in FOIA as w e llin Exemption 6, which applies to “personnel and medical files” 12—and
that in Exemption 6, the word unquestionably meant “human
resources.”18 The C ourt—using the typical plain language technique of
looking at the words of the statute, but only the words of the statute, to
determine their proper interpretation—reasoned that the parallel use of
the term “personnel” in another FOIA exemption was an important
indication of how that term should be construed throughout the statute.
And the Court said that “[b]y no stretch of imagination” does the ESQD
material “relate to ‘personnel rules and practices,’ as that term is most
naturally understood.”19
The plain language arguments in support of the C ourt’s conclusion
are, without question, very strong. In fact, Justice Breyer, the sole
dissenter, did not challenge them .20 But for several reasons, Milner
presents an unusually strong case for departing from the plain language.
The fact that the Court nonetheless followed the plain language—and, as
I said, did so nearly unanimously—shows how firm a grip the plain
language approach has on the Roberts Court
A.
The first reason for departing from the plain language approach in
Milner is that it is difficult to believe that Congress would have wanted
the ESQD materials disclosed. No one could say that this was a case in
which the government was resisting a FOIA request for illegitimate
reasons. In fact, the Court itself explicitly “recognize[d] the strength of
the Navy’s interest in protecting the ESQD data and maps and other
similar information.”21 The Court even noted that the Navy had said
that “[pjublicjly] disclosing the [ESQD] information would significantly
risk undermining the Navy’s ability to safely and securely store military
ordnance”22 and that the Court had no reason to doubt that that was
true. W hat is more, the Court went out of its way to try to show that the
ESQD information could, in the end, be kept secret. The Court

is
is
17
is
19
20

Milner, 562 U.S. at 569.
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2012).

Milner, 562 U.S. at 570.
Id. at 572.
See id. at 585-93 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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suggested three other exemptions that might apply to the ESQD
material,23 and Justice Alito devoted a concurring opinion to explaining
in detail how the Navy, on remand, could argue that a different
exemption applied to that material.24 One might reasonably ask: if the
reasons for allowing the government to withhold these materials are so
strong, why, exactly, should FOIA be interpreted to mandate their
disclosure?
One brief passage in the majority’s opinion might be seen as
answering this question. The Court asserted that “[t]he statute’s purpose
reinforce[d] ” the Court’s interpretation of Exemption 2 because the
Court “ha[s] often noted ‘the Act’s goal of broad disclosure’ and insisted
that the exemptions be ‘given a narrow compass.’”25 But the question, of
course, is whether the Court gave the exemption too narrow a compass.
One purpose of FOIA is to provide broad disclosure; but at the same
time, it is a purpose of FOIA to exempt some materials from
disclosure.26 Otherwise there would be no exemptions in the statute.
The Court, in fact, seemed to recognize that its argument about FOIA’s
purpose did not add much, because it concluded its discussion by saying
that it had “give[n] the exemption the ‘narrower reach’ Congress
intended through the simple device of confining the provision’s
meaning to its words.”22 That is, the Court recognized that its decision
really relied just on the language of the statute. That is how the plain
language approach works; arguable statutory purposes are consulted, if
at all, only in a limited and secondary way.
B.
The second reason for questioning the Court’s reliance on the
language of the statute is that the decision overturned a long-standing

21 Id. at 580.
Id. (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
23 id. at 580-81.
24 Id. at 581-85 (Alito, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 571 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136,151 (1989)).
26 This is a general problem with arguments that invoke the purpose of a statute: no statute
pursues a single purpose; there are always cross-cutting purposes. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United
States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987) (per curiam) (“[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all
costs. Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a
particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice . . . . ”). For a general discussion, see
David A. Strauss, Not Unwritten, After All?, 126 H arv. L. Rev . 1532, 1537 (2013) (reviewing
Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and P rinciples
W e Live By (2012)).
27 Milner, 562 U.S. at 572 (citation omitted).
22
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and uniform interpretation of Exemption 2. That is how Justice Breyer
began his dissenting opinion:
Justice Stevens has explained that, once “a statute has been
construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by
otherfederal judges and agencies,” it can acquire a clear meaning that
this Court should hesitate to change. I would apply that principle to
this case and accept the 30-year-old decision by the D.C. Circuit in
Crooker . . . .28
Even apart from the point Justice Breyer was making—that the
exemption should have been interpreted in a way that was consistent
with established practice—this passage is notable for a couple of
reasons. As I mentioned earlier, Justice Breyer did not even engage the
majority’s arguments about the language of the statute. He effectively
conceded that the majority had the better arguments on that point. And
Justice Breyer’s reference to Justice Stevens was revealing. Justice
Stevens was a frequent critic of what he considered to be the over-use of
plain language arguments; as I will discuss later, Justice Stevens wrote an
opinion in an earlier Roberts Court case, when the Court was much
more closely divided about the use of the plain language approach,
sharply questioning the use of that approach.29 But Justice Stevens was,
of course, not on the Court by the time Milner was decided. In fact, he
had been replaced by the author of the Milner majority opinion, Justice
Kagan.
Just as Justice Breyer did not quarrel with the majority’s view of the
language of Exemption 2, the majority did not strongly contest Justice
Breyer’s assertion that the Milner decision was inconsistent with long
standing practice. The majority recognized that three circuits had
adopted Crooker s “High 2” interpretation.30 Three other courts of
appeals had adopted a contrary view before Crooker was decided.31
Justice Breyer asserted that two of those courts of appeals had changed
their view;32 the majority disagreed on that point,33 but the majority did
not deny that the Crooker approach was dominant in the lower courts.

28 Id. at 585 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
29 See Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 133 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted) (quoting with approval the observation that “the ‘minimalist’ judge ‘who
holds that the purpose of the statute may be learned only from its language’ has more discretion
than the judge ‘who will seek guidance from every reliable source.’”); infra notes 77-80 and
accompanying text.
30 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
31 See Milner, 562 U.S. at 567 n.2 (citing Cox v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302, 130910 (8th Cir. 1978); Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1973); and Hawkes v. IRS, 467
F.2d 787, 797 (6th Cir. 1972)).
32 Milner, 562 U.S. at 586 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 576 n.7 (majority opinion).
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As Justice Breyer said in his dissent, “the Crooker interpretation of
Exemption 2 has guided nearly every Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) case decided over the last 30 years.”34 In fact, the majority
explicitly “acknowledge[d] that our decision today upsets three decades
of agency practice relying on Crooker, and therefore may force
considerable adjustments.”35
But the majority rejected the idea that that practice could alter the
proper interpretation of Exemption 2. The majority said that Justice
Breyer’s assertions about the court of appeals cases “would be
immaterial even if true, because we have no warrant to ignore clear
statutory language on the ground that other courts have done so.”36 This
statement of the majority’s is, in fact, almost certainly stronger than it
should have been. It is hard to believe that the Justices in the majority
would never defer to established precedent that interpreted a statute in a
way that departed from the plain language. In fact, as I will suggest
below, there are several important statutes that are uncontroversially
interpreted in ways that are hard to reconcile with their language. But
the majority’s willingness to make such a flat statement indicates just
how strong a hold the plain language approach has on the current
Court.
C.
The final reason to question the Court’s reliance on plain language
in Milner—and to view that reliance as a sign that a substantial majority
of the Court is firmly committed to a plain language approach—has to
do with the nature of the Freedom of Information Act. It is one thing to
adhere closely to the language of a statute that is narrowly drawn to
address a specific problem. But FOIA is not that kind of statute. One
might describe FOIA as quasi-constitutional, in the sense that it
established a disclosure regime that governs a wide variety of materials,
circumstances, and government agencies. Justice Breyer made this point
as well. Fie referred to the Court’s “longstanding recognition that it
cannot interpret the FOIA. . . with the linguistic literalism fit for
interpretations of the tax code.”37 The reason, he said, is that FOIA
“must govern the affairs of a vast Executive Branch with numerous
different agencies, bureaus, and departments, performing numerous
tasks of many different kinds. Too narrow an interpretation, while
34
35
36
37

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

586 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
580 (majority opinion).
576.
589 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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working well in the case of one agency, may seriously interfere with
congressional objectives when applied to another.”38
In fact, there are several important statutes that the courts treat in
the way that Justice Breyer urged the Milner Court to treat FOIA. The
Sherman Antitrust Act is a familiar example. The Court has explicitly
treated the Sherman Act as an authorization to create a body of judgemade law “to meet the dynamics of present economic conditions.”39 The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), of which FOIA is a component,
has also been interpreted in ways that are difficult to reconcile with its
text (as Justice Breyer’s dissent pointed out)40—again because of the
APA’s quasi-constitutional character.41 Section 1983 of Title 42, which
authorizes private parties to sue state actors for violations of federal
constitutional rights, has also been interpreted in a way that makes it a
workable and practical enforcement scheme, without close attention to
the text.42 Section 1331 of Title 28, which gives federal district courts
jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law, is the basis for a
complex body of judge-made law that is designed to advance the
apparent purposes of the statute while accounting for the practicalities
of litigation.43
The Court in Milner could, then, easily have decided the case in a
way that departed from the plain meaning of Exemption 2. Whether the
Court should have done so is fairly arguable. The text is, after all, quite
clear, and there is a risk that the Crooker interpretation of the exemption
would allow the government, in other cases, to withhold materials that
should be disclosed, even if the Navy had excellent reasons not to
disclose the materials at issue in Milner itself. On the other hand, one
might say that the Milner Court attached too much significance to the
language of the statute and should instead have seen itself as more of a
partner with Congress and the lower courts, allowing the workable
scheme established by Crooker to continue to operate. What purpose is
38 Id.
39 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007).
40 See Milner, 562 U.S. at 589 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Judicial interpretation o f the
malleable language o f the APA has produced changes in the rulemaking procedure that could
be characterized as revolutionary if they had been affected [sic] in a day or a year rather than
gradually over a period o f decades.” (quoting Richard J. Pierce, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
T reatise 413 (4th ed. 2002))).
41 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 Geo .
WASH. L. Rev . 1293 (2012). See generally David A. Strauss, Foreword, Does the Constitution
Mean What It Says?, 129 H arv . L. Re v . 1 ,2 5 -2 6 (2015).
42 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist

Theories of Statutory Interpretation—And the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within
Both, 99 C ornell L. Rev . 685, 691-92, 718-22 (2014).
43 See Richard H. Fallon , Jr . et al „ H art a n d W echsler ’s the Federal C ourts a n d
the

Federal System 780-95 (6th ed. 2009).
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served by reaching a result that Congress could not plausibly have
intended, in the interpretation of a statute that invites courts to partner
with Congress in fashioning a workable scheme, when the lower courts
and the executive agencies have, for several decades, followed a practice
that is at least not clearly unacceptable? Be that as it may, the strength of
the argument for departing from plain meaning in Milner—and the fact
that the Court’s refusal to depart from it was nearly unanimous—
suggest that the plain language view is a deeply rooted aspect of the
Roberts Court’s approach to statutory interpretation, one that is likely to
persist no matter who the next appointee is.
II.
Of course, most statutory interpretation cases are not like Milner.
They do not produce counter-intuitive results; they do not overturn
long-standing judicial and administrative practice; and they do not
involve quasi-constitutional statutes like FOIA. In those run-of-the-mill
cases, too, the Roberts Court has consistently followed a plain language
approach. There has been disagreement, but the disagreement has been
over the right way to read the language of the statute, not over whether
the issue should be approached in a different way. These cases, with
their more quotidian character, illustrate in a different way from Milner
the appeal that the plain language approach has for the Roberts Court.
Two very recent cases, chosen more or less at random, make the
point. In Simmons v. Himmelreich, 44 the issue was whether the so-called
“judgment bar” provision 45 of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) 45
applied to a prisoner’s claim against government employees. Ordinarily,
the U.S. government is protected against damages actions by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. The government cannot be sued for
damages unless it waives its immunity. The FTC A is such a waiver of
the sovereign immunity of the United States, thus permitting damages
actions against against the government, for torts committed by federal
employees, in certain circumstances. But the FTCA specifies exceptions
to the waiver of sovereign immunity—cases in which suits against the
government are not allowed. One of those exceptions is for claims based
upon the exercise of a “discretionary function ” 47 by a government
employee.

136 S. Ct. 1843 (2016).
45 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (2012).
46 2 8 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80.
47 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
44
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The plaintiff in Simmons sued the United States under the FTCA,
but his suit was dismissed under the “discretionary function” exception.
The plaintiff then tried to sue the individual government employees
who, he claimed, had injured him. The employees asserted that that
individual action was barred by another provision of the FTCA, the
“judgment bar” provision. That provision states that a judgment in an
FTCA action bars any suit against individual defendants. 48
The plaintiff s response relied on the language of the FTCA. The
specific wording of the discretionary function exception (and other
similar exceptions) is that “[t]he provisions of this chapter [the chapter
that includes the FTCA] . . . shall not apply to” claims based on the
performance of a discretionary function . 49 This is a straightforward way
of implementing an exception: it states that the provisions of the FTCA
do not apply to certain claims, so the government has not waived its
sovereign immunity and an FTCA action cannot be brought on the
basis of such claims.
The problem for the individual defendants was that the judgment
bar is part of the same “chapter. ” 50 So the statute says, clearly enough,
that the judgment bar does not apply to cases that are within the
discretionary function exception. The result was that the plaintiff, whose
case against the government was dismissed because it fell within that
exception, was not restricted by the judgment bar and could bring suit
against individual defendants.
The Court reached that conclusion, unanimously, on the basis of
the language of the statute, in two brisk paragraphs. 51 Indeed, the Court
said, the statute was so clear that “a reader might be forgiven for
wondering how there could be any confusion about the statute’s
operation . ” 52 The Court acknowledged, though, that there were some
complications. In an earlier case, involving an exception in the FTCA
for claims arising in a foreign country, the Court had held that the
judgment bar did apply. And it acknowledged that declining to apply
other provisions of the same “chapter” to cases that fell within an
exception might produce troubling results. 53 But the earlier case could
be distinguished, and the potentially troublesome hypothetical, the
Court said, could be dealt with as they arose. 54

48 28 U.S.C. § 2676.
49 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
50 See Simmons v. Himmelreich, 136 S. Ct. 1843,1847 (2016).
51 See id. at 1847-48.
52 Id. at 1848.
53 Id. at 1849.
54 Id.
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Again what is notable about the case is how easily, even reflexively,
the Court used the plain language approach. The result in Simmons was
certainly plausible. As the Court said, there would be a reason to bar a
suit against individuals if the judgment in favor of the United States
were based on, for example, a conclusion that the plaintiff was not
injured, or that government employees committed no wrongful act.ss By
contrast, a ruling that a suit against the United States falls within the
“discretionary function” exception does not obviously provide a similar
reason to bar a suit against individuals. As the Court noted, the
common law doctrine of claim preclusion operates in that way.se The
Court could have rested its decision on precisely that ground. It could
have drawn the analogy to claim preclusion and reasoned that whatever
might be said about other exceptions, the dismissal of an FTCA action
under the “discretionary function” exception should not bar an
individual action. That would have avoided the awkwardness of saying,
as the Court did in its opinion, that the language was clear but that,
despite the language, it might have to reach a different result in future
cases. But for the Roberts Court, the path of least resistance was to
follow the plain language, and that was the path that it unanimously
took.
Another recent case, Lockhart v. United States, 57 similarly shows
how the Court’s instinct is to do everything it can to decide a case on the
basis of the statutory language; the Court relegates other possible
sources to the background, to be used only secondarily. Lockhart
involved a badly drafted statute that, unsurprisingly, spawned litigation.
The statute provided that offenders convicted of possessing child
pornography are to receive a mandatory minimum sentence of ten
years’ imprisonment if they have “a prior conviction . . . under the laws
of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive
sexual conduct involving a minor or ward/’ss The defendant in Lockhart
had previously been convicted, in a state prosecution, of sexual abuse
involving an adult. So the question was whether the phrase “involving a
minor or ward” applied only to “abusive sexual conduct” or applied to
the entire list (“aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual
conduct”). If it applied to the entire list, the defendant was not subject to
the mandatory minimum sentence. But if the correct way to read that
statute was that it was referring to “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual
abuse” or “abusive sexual conduct involving a minor,” then the
defendant was subject to the mandatory minimum.
55
56

Id. at
Id. at

1850.
1849 n.5.

57 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016).
58

18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2) (2012).
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The Court ruled, over two dissenting votes, that the phrase
“involving a m inor” applied only to “abusive sexual conduct.” Both the
majority and the dissent focused very closely on the language of the
statute and related statutes. Specifically, the majority “applied an
interpretive strategy called the ‘rule of the last antecedent.’”59 According
to that rule, “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as
modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.”60 The
dissent argued, in response, that the rule of the last antecedent does not
apply to a “single, integrated list.”61 The dissent said that when the list
has that character, the modifier applies to every item on the list. So, in
Lockhart, the m andatory m inim um sentence would be imposed only if
the prior conviction involved a m inor or a ward.
Much of the back-and-forth between the majority and the dissent
took the form of offering examples of common speech in which the rule
of the last antecedent either would or would not apply. So, for example,
the majority gave this example:
[I]magine you are the general manager of the Yankees and you are
rounding out your 2016 roster. You tell your scouts to find a
defensive catcher, a quick-footed shortstop, or a pitcher from last
year’s World Champion Kansas City Royals. It would be natural for
your scouts to confine their search for a pitcher to last year’s
championship team, but to look more broadly for catchers and
shortstops.62
And:
It would be as if a friend asked you to get her tart lemons, sour
lemons, or sour fruit from Mexico [and] . . . you brought back
lemons from California, but your friend insisted that she was using
customary speech and obviously asked for Mexican fruit only, you
would be forgiven for disagreeing on both counts.63
The dissent responded:
Imagine a friend told you that she hoped to meet “an actor, director,
or producer involved with the new Star Wars movie.” You would
know immediately that she wanted to meet an actor from the Star
Wars cast—not an actor in, for example, the latest Zoolander.
Suppose a real estate agent promised to find a client “a house, condo,
or apartment in New York.” Wouldn’t the potential buyer be
annoyed if the agent sent him information about condos in Maryland

59 Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 962 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
61 Id. at 970 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
62 Id. at 963 (majority opinion).
63 Id. at 966.
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or California? And consider a law imposing a penalty for the
“violation of any statute, rule, or regulation relating to insider
trading.” Surely a person would have cause to protest if punished
under that provision for violating a traffic statute. The reason in all
three cases is the same: Everyone understands that the modifying
phrase—“involved with the new Star Wars movie,” “in New York,”
“relating to insider trading”—applies to each term in the preceding
list, not just the last. That ordinary understanding of how English
works, in speech and writing alike, should decide this case. 64

Even apart from the tone of the examples, which might seem
inappropriate for a criminal case, especially one involving serious
offenses and a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence, it is not
immediately clear why this battle of linguistic intuitions should resolve
the case. The statute was obviously not well drafted: even apart from the
ambiguity that created the issue in Lockhart, the phrase “aggravated
sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor
or ward” is obviously redundant, because “sexual abuse” will include
“aggravated sexual abuse” (as both the majority and the dissent noted).
So it is not as if one can assume that Congress drafted this language with
an eye to subtle linguistic nuances.
In fairness, there were other indications of how the case should be
decided, and both the majority and dissent did address them. For
example, the majority also argued, pretty persuasively, that previous
convictions for federal sexual abuse offenses could also lead to the
imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence, and that the federal
offenses in those categories included both offenses involving adults and
offenses involving minors. 66 That suggested, the majority concluded,
that state offenses involving adults should also call for a mandatory
minimum sentence. The dissent, for its part, discussed legislative history
that supported its position fairly strongly.66 Both of those arguments do
seem to provide some genuine insight into what Congress actually was
trying to do when it enacted the statute—greater insight, one might
think, than trying to determine whether the list was one to which the
rule of the last antecedent should apply.
Neither the majority nor the dissent ignored those other sources of
statutory meaning. But the emphasis of both opinions was on the close
reading of the words of the statute alone. The majority could have said,
in effect: this statute is obviously poorly drafted, so we will get little
enlightenment from parsing its exact words; instead, let’s see what we
can learn from other potential sources. Or the dissent could have taken
m Id. at 969 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 963-64 (majority opinion).
66 id. at 973-75 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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that approach, criticizing the majority for claiming to find answers in
the wording when plainly none were there. Instead, both opinions dwelt
intensely on the wording of the statute. This uniformity of commitment
to the plain language rule, whatever the other disagreements, is
characteristic of the Roberts Court.
III.
The emphasis on plain language is not new. It has, as I have said,
been a hallmark of Roberts Court opinions—and before that, Rehnquist
Court opinions, and even Burger Court opinions67—for quite some
time. W hat is new is the nearly unanimous adoption of the plain
language approach by the Justices, exemplified by Justice Breyer’s lonely
but very plausible dissent in Milner. The turning point, for the Roberts
Court, seems to have been when Justices Souter and Stevens were
replaced by, respectively, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan. I mentioned
earlier that Justice Breyer, in his dissent in Milner, had singled out
Justice Stevens’s arguments about how consistent past practice might
justify overriding the apparent plain meaning of the words of a statute.
And in fact, in an earlier Roberts Court case, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams,6S a dissenting opinion written by Justice Stevens provided a
powerful counterpoint to the plain language approach. The contrast
between Circuit City to Milner shows how the plain language approach,
highly influential before, has now come to dominate the Roberts Court.
The issue in Circuit City was whether an employee’s state-law
employment discrimination claim could be brought in court or was
subject to arbitration. The employee, Adams, had signed an
employment application providing that all employment-related disputes
would be arbitrated. When Adams sued in state court, the employer,
Circuit City, sought a federal court injunction against the suit, asserting
that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)<® made the suit subject to
arbitration, notwithstanding any provision of state law. Adams
responded that the FAA did not apply to employment contracts.
67 For example, one of the most famous plain language opinions is the majority opinion in
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), which was written by Chief Justice
Burger. In that case, the Court held that the plain language of the Endangered Species Act
required the Tennessee Valley Authority to stop work on a mostly-completed dam in order to
prevent a small and supposedly insignificant species of fish, the snail darter, from becoming
extinct.
68 532 U.S. 105, 133 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting with approval the observation
that “the ‘minimalist’ judge ‘who holds that the purpose of the statute may be learned only from
its language’ has more discretion than the judge ‘who will seek guidance from every reliable
source’” (citation omitted)).
69 9 U.S.C. §§1-14(2012).
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The case turned on two provisions of the FAA. One provision,
section 2, specifies that “[a] written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”™
But another provision, section 1, exempts from the FAA “contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”71 Adams asserted
that his employment contract was not with section 2, because it was not
“[a] maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce.”72 Adams also said that even if his contract was
within the scope of section 2, it was exempted by section 1, because it
was a contract^ of employment o f’ a worker “engaged in . . . interstate
commerce.”73
A five-justice majority resolved the case primarily on the basis of
the language of the FAA. Adams said that the language of section 2,
which made a ‘contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce”
subject to arbitration, encompassed only commercial contracts, not
employment contracts. The Court rejected that argument primarily on
the ground that it would make the section 1 exemption for employment
contracts superfluous, and the Court said—citing a familiar principle of
statutory construction—a statute should generally be interpreted in a
way that does not make any of its provisions superfluous.™ Adams then
said that section 1 exempted his employment contract because if his
contract was one “involving commerce” within the meaning of section
2, then he must be a worker “engaged in” commerce, and such workers’
employment contracts are within the section 1 exemption.
The Court rejected that argument, too, again primarily by engaging
in a close reading of the language of the statute. For one thing, the Court
said, section 2 and section 1 were phrased differently. Section 2 used the
term involving” commerce; section 1 referred to workers “engaged in”
commerce. “Involving,” the Court said, was a broader term.73 Adams’s
work might “involve” commerce because his employer shipped and
received goods in interstate commerce, but Adams himself, who worked
in a store, was not “engaged” in the movement of goods.
The Court also relied on the fact that section 1 referred to “seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or

70

71
72
73
74
75

9 U.S.C. § 2.
9 U.S.C. § 1.
9 U.S.C. § 2.
9 U.S.C. § 1.
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,113 (2001).
See id. at 115-16.
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interstate commerce.” The Court reasoned that when a general term,
like “workers engaged i n . . . commerce” was preceded by specific
examples, the general term is limited to instances like the specifics. In
reaching that conclusion, the Court relied on “the maxim ejusdem
generis, the statutory canon that ‘[w]here general words follow specific
words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to
embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by
the preceding specific words.’”76 So, the Court concluded, the exemption
for “workers engaged i n . . . commerce” extended only to employees
who, like “seamen” and “railroad employees,” were actually engaged in
the movement of goods.
More was involved in Circuit City than just the bare language of the
statute; there were some precedents that had interpreted some of the
terms of the FAA and similar terms in other statutes, and there was a
background of Supreme Court decisions dealing with the scope of
Congress’s power under the Constitution to regulate interstate
commerce. But it is fair to say that the majority in Circuit City decided
the case primarily by looking within the four corners of the statute. The
Court examined the precise words used (“involving” versus “engaging”)
and relied on principles about how to read a statutory text (ejusdem
generis, and the presumption that no provisions are superfluous).
Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg dissented; all four
joined in each of the two dissenting opinions, written by Justices Stevens
and Souter respectively. Justice Stevens’s approach—consistent with the
role he played in Justice Breyer’s Milner dissent—offered the clearest
contrast to the plain language view.77 Rather than puzzling over the
exact words of the text, he asked, in effect: what decisions did Congress
make when it enacted the FAA? lie looked at the legislative history of
the statute and saw that it was prom pted by the desire to make
commercial contracts arbitrable.78 No one at the time the FAA was
being debated, he said, suggested that employment contracts should be
subject to arbitration. Nonetheless, some representatives of organized
labor objected that the FAA might be interpreted to apply to
employment contracts. Although the supporters of the FAA insisted
that section 2, as written, did not apply to employment contracts in the
first place, they agreed to add section 1 to put the matter beyond
doubt.79 Section 1 was not superfluous; it was added out of an
abundance of caution. That, Justice Stevens said, was what the legislative
history of the FAA actually showed.
76
77
78
79

Id. at 114-15 (citation omitted).
See id. at 124-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 125.
See id. at 128.
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Justice Stevens criticized the majority for “[p]laying ostrich to the
substantial history behind the amendment”80 and “reason[ing] in a
vacuum”8i that section 1 was superfluous—criticisms that will often
apply to the plain language approach generally. But, as Milner
illustrated, Justice Stevens’s skepticism about the plain meaning
approach—which had four adherents at the time of Circuit City in
2001—now seems to be limited to a single member of the Court.
IV.
In some recent high-profile cases, the Roberts Court seems to have
departed from the plain language approach. But the significant thing
about the Roberts Court’s apparent commitment to the plain language
approach is that the Court will use that approach, time and again, in the
more ordinary statutory interpretation cases that come before the Court
quite frequently. For that reason, focusing on the exceptional cases, in
this respect, can be misleading.
For example, one of the exceptions—King v. Burnell**—was a very
highly publicized case in which the plaintiffs sought a construction of
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that might have seriously undermined
the workability of the ACA. The ACA is, of course, a very important
statute that was highly controversial politically. The Court in King
acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ “arguments about the plain meaning of
[the relevant provision of the ACA] are strong.”88 But the Court ruled
that, in context, the language of that provision was “ambiguous”8^ and
for that reason “turn[ed] to the broader structure of the Act to
determine the meaning o f’ that provision.85
The concluding passage in the majority opinion in King was, in
fact, a summary of an approach that is very much in tension with the
plain language view:
Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health
insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must
interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and
avoids the latter. [The relevant section] can fairly be read consistent

so id. at 128.
Id.
82 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
83 Id. at 2495.
84 Id. at 2492.
85 Id.
81
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with what we see as Congress’s plan, and that is the reading we
adopt.86
The dissent, predictably, pilloried the majority for not following the
plain language.87 But because King v. Burwell was such a high-profile,
politically-salient case, it would be a mistake to generalize from it in
describing the Roberts Court’s general approach to statutory
interpretation.
The way the case was argued is, perhaps, more revealing. The brief
for the federal government—urging the interpretation of the ACA that
the Court ultimately adopted—overwhelmingly emphasized the textual
argument in support of its position.88 Arguments based on the ACA’s
structure and design were secondary,89 and arguments based on the
legislative history were tertiary.96 The Solicitor General, representing the
federal government, knew his audience. In order to have the best chance
of prevailing, he would have to show the Court that there was a strong
argument based on the language of the statute for the interpretation
favoring the government. To concede that the language was contrary to
the government’s position—or even that it was ambiguous—would
seriously damage the government’s litigating position.
If, in fact, the Roberts Court has coalesced around a plain language
approach to statutes, how are we to explain that? And is it a good
development? An enormous am ount has been written about the various
approaches to statutory interpretation, but it may be worth identifying
one major problem—and also one major virtue—of the plain language
approach. The problem becomes apparent in a case like Lockhart.
Whatever else one might say about the issue in that case, it is entirely
clear that the drafters of the statute were not thinking about that issue
when they drafted the statute; if they had been thinking of it, they would
never have drafted the statute in the way they did. The majority and
dissent disagreed about whether the “rule of the last antecedent” applied
to the crucial phrase, but unless one is going to attribute some kind of
unconscious intention to the drafters, the answer to that question has no
relationship to any decision made by the legislature. In contrast, the
other sources that the opinions considered—the parallel treatm ent of
federal law, and the legislative history—do have a relationship to that
decision, however difficult it might be to assign the proper weight to
those sources. But those sources played second fiddle in both opinions.
86
87
88
114).
89
90

Id. at 2496.
See id. at 2496-507 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Brief for the Respondents at 19-35, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (No. 14See id. at 35-41.
See id. at 45-51.
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More generally, in any case where reasonable people might
disagree about what outcome is dictated by the meaning of the words in
a statute, it is very likely that the words were not written with that case
in mind; if they had been written with that case in mind, the authors
would have made the answer clear. So the resolution of the
disagreement about the meaning of the words in a statute will often be
divorced from the actual decisions made by the authors of the provision.
And then it becomes unclear why we care about the meaning, since the
point of the enterprise, presumably, is to give effect to a decision made
by the legislature that drafted and enacted the words. 91
The unobvious virtue of the plain language approach is, in a way,
the other side of that problem. The plain language approach is, in an
important way, easier and less divisive for the Justices. 92 In principle,
they need only look at a series of words in a statute. They do not have to
consider the purposes of the statute, or the policy implications that
might be advanced or defeated by one or another interpretation of the
statute. Those latter considerations potentially implicate political or
other sensitive views that might be divisive. Should employment
contracts be subject to arbitration? How much leeway should
government agencies have to withhold materials that might
compromise their mission? Should people who possess child
pornography receive a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence if they
have previously been convicted of certain crimes? Those are difficult
and controversial questions and, while the interpretation of the statutes
in Circuit City, Milner, and Lockhart would not require answers to those
questions specifically, an approach that went beyond the words—and
looked at the underlying purposes, or at what the legislature was trying
to accomplish, or at whether established practices should be preserved—
could easily lead judges, or Justices, to engage those questions in some
form.
By contrast, the plain language approach only requires an
argument about language. Instead of considering difficult and
potentially divisive policy issues, the Justices just have to consult the
intuitions they have as people who speak English. Instead of having
competing views about sensitive policy matters, we will have competing
analogies to baseball general managers’ decisions or shopping lists or
other features of everyday conversation; or we will have an effort to put
together pieces of a statutory jigsaw in a way that attaches different
91 This point has been made in many places, but for one such discussion, see, for example,
David A. Strauss, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. Rev. 1565, 1570-72 (1997).
92 This account is indebted to Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the
Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. Rev . 231. There is also a discussion in
Strauss, supra note 91, at 1579-81.
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meanings to different words (like “engaging” and “involving”) and
makes no piece of the puzzle superfluous. It would be unfair to say that
the plain language approach turns statutory interpretation into a kind of
word game, but something like that is true. And it is not hard to see
why, on a Court that often divides on highly controversial matters, word
games might be pretty appealing.
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